Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillars for the International Criminal Court by Lietzau, William K.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 32
Issue 3 Symposium 1999 Article 5
Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof:
Structural Pillars for the International Criminal
Court
William K. Lietzau
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell
International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lietzau, William K. (1999) "Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural Pillars for the International Criminal Court,"
Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 32: Iss. 3, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol32/iss3/5
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International Criminal Court
William K. Lietzau*
Introduction
The recently negotiated treaty to establish the International Criminal
Court (ICC)1 faces a wide array of controversial jurisdictional and proce-
dural issues that will have to be resolved before the Court can function
effectively. To date, attention has focused primarily on the Court's juris-
dictional mechanism, which involves such politically charged issues as U.S.
foreign policy in the emerging world order, international relationships
among states, and political relationships between states and the Court. In
contrast, procedural issues involving the Court's technical operations and
its relationship with individuals have received comparatively little
attention.
This Symposium's second panel, entitled "From Paper to Practice:
Institutional Arrangement and Preparatory Work," addresses these often
overlooked procedural issues. While a discussion of the practical aspects
of implementing a functioning ICC might seem inconsequential or mun-
dane in comparison with the first panel's jurisdictional focus,2 it would be
an acute error to trivialize the Court's procedural development. Elements
of Crimes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure are the nuts and bolts of
any criminal justice system. They also provide normative guidelines that
help establish a court's subordinate status with respect to the rule of law
and consequently the moral authority of its decisions. If and when the ICC
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a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
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the U.S. proposal for Elements of Crimes being negotiated by the Preparatory
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Defense or of the Government of the United States.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
The final form of the Statute contains technical modifications to the original text
adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998 [here-
inafter Diplomatic Conference].
2. The first panel was entitled "Acquisition ofJurisdiction: Triggering Mechanisms
& Crimes."
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begins to conduct business, the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence
and Procedure will be of foremost importance to those dealing directly
with the Court.3
This Article is designed to explain the significance of the work being
done by the ICC's PrepCom, the body responsible for drafting these rules
and elements.4 In particular, the Article will focus on the development of
the Elements of Crimes and the challenges facing that nascent endeavor.
The Article will also describe how the seemingly pedestrian preparatory
work of developing Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence and Proce-
dure fit into the larger policy debate surrounding the ICC and the United
States' response to it.
I. U.S. Intent in Establishing Elements of Crimes
The ICC's authority rests on two equally important foundations: the pow-
ers granted to it by the ICC Statute, and broad-based international accept-
ance. Since achieving wide support for the ICC often depended on limiting
its powers, the Court's proponents faced the challenging task of balancing
these conflicting sources of authority.5 Unfortunately, many states have
viewed the accommodations made to strike that balance as weakening the
Court, particularly when those accommodations were directed at the
United States. In fact, the jurisdictional and procedural checks and bal-
ances sought by the United States strengthen the Court's credibility
because they ensure that the Court is operating within the rule of law.6
3. Anyone who has stood before a judge as a criminal defense lawyer is well aware
that, to a criminal defendant, Rules of Evidence and Procedure may be technical, but are
certainly not trivial. Likewise, the Elements of Crimes may seem mundane to the casual
observer, but they are critical in the eyes of the accused. For the parties standing before
the Court, jurisdictional issues (which are of particular concern to States) pale in com-
parison to the facts of their case and how these facts will be adduced.
4. The PrepCom was established in the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Resolution F of the Final Act require the PrepCom to draft Rules
of Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes before June 30, 2000. See Final Act
of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., Annex 1, Res. F, para. 5-6, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998) [hereinafter Resolution F]. Other PrepCom duties include
drafting the following: a relationship agreement between the Court and the United
Nations; basic principles governing a headquarters agreement to be negotiated between
the Court and the host country; financial rules and regulations; an agreement articulat-
ing the privileges and immunities of the Court; a budget for the first financial year; and
rules of procedure for the Assembly of States Parties. Philippe Kirsch, Chairman of the
PrepCom, has scheduled open working group negotiating sessions solely for Elements
of Crimes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure. Other issues are being handled infor-
mally by designated "friends of the Chair." The PrepCom met February 16-26 and July
26-August 13, 1999; a third meeting is scheduled for November 29-December 17, 1999.
See Establishment of an International Criminal Court, G.A. Res, 53/105, U.N. GAOR, 53d
Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/105 (1999).
5. See Philippe Kirsch, Keynote Address, 32 CORNELL INT'L .J. 437 (1999).
6. For example, the vast majority of the Court's proponents viewed the U.S. propo-
sal to establish the Elements of Crimes as an unnecessary restraint, if not an outright
threat to progressive judicial activism. The proposal actually aimed to give teeth to the
fundamental legal principle of nullum crimen sine lege. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art.
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The jurisdictional checks and balances proposed by the United States
pertain to the Court's status relative to states, to the Security Council, and
to other international organizations. 7 Determining the Court's proper
position vis-d- vis these bodies will require balancing multiple factors,
including state sovereignty and the preservation of certain international
structures on the one hand, and the enforcement of specific international
legal norms on the other. However, a discussion of the Statute's controver-
sial jurisdictional scheme is outside of the scope of this Article.
In contrast, procedural checks and balances (which pertain to the
internal conduct of trials) should be easier to establish. Although the
PrepCom will also need to balance an array of potentially controversial
factors (i.e., weighing the interest in prosecuting wrongdoers against inter-
ests in protecting the rights of a defendant and preserving the fairness of
the system), it can look to existing criminal law for guidance in developing
rules and elements.8
For several reasons, the PrepCom's most important task in developing
procedural checks and balances will be establishing the Elements of
Crimes.9 First, the drafters of the ICC Statute strove to clearly delineate the
principles and statutory provisions governing the Rules of Evidence and
Procedure. 10 Because of this early emphasis on many procedural and evi-
22 (Nullum crimen sine lege) (requiring that crime definitions be "strictly construed").
More specifically, the U.S. proposal for Elements was designed to (1) be faithful to cus-
tomary international law, (2) strike an appropriate balance in accommodating concerns
expressed by interested states, and (3) interpret general international law norms with
the specificity and rigor appropriate for criminal law.
7. For example, the United States has forcefully criticized the ICC Statute's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over non-party nationals. This jurisdictional assertion is the most
controversial characteristic of the ICC Statute, since the international community lacks
dearly relevant historical precedents regardinganalogous jurisdictional regimes. For a
discussion of the U.S. position regarding ICC jurisdiction, see Michael F. Lohr & Wil-
liam K. Lietzau, One Road Away from Rome: Concerns Regarding the International Crimi-
nal Court, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 1999). See also DavidJ. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and
the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNI. INA' LJ. 529 (1999).
8. National jurisdictions provide protections that ensure trials are just and fair, and
safeguards that mandate adequate notice and preclude inappropriate judicial legislation.
Consider, e.g., jurisprudence surrounding constitutional protections against ex post
facto laws and forced self-incrimination.
9. The United States recognized the importance of developing Elements and Rules
of Evidence and Procedure early in the negotiating process. Prior to the Rome Diplo-
matic Conference, the U.S. delegation identified those ICC issues having the greatest
potential to affect U.S. interests. The Court's jurisdictional mechanism was usually
identified as the leading issue, followed by the list of crimes subject to the Court's juris-
diction and their elements, and then by Rules of Evidence and Procedure. It is interest-
ing to note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when briefed on various ICC issues, quickly
recognized the importance of Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure.
Most generals and admirals have convened courts-martials, referred criminal matters to
trial, and signed orders executing court judgments. Therefore, military leaders tend to
be more familiar with criminal legal matters than most policy-makers. In contrast, most
of the delegates at Rome were international lawyers (especially human rights lawyers)
rather than experienced criminal litigators.
10. See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 1, arts. 22-33, 53-61, 63-76, and 81-85 (discuss-
ing various rights of the accused and trial issues frequently found in rules of procedure
and evidence).
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dentiary rules, the PrepCom's work in this area will be more technical than
substantive. Second, the debate surrounding Rules of Evidence and Proce-
dure is rooted less in philosophical differences than in mechanical differ-
ences between legal systems, most notably the civil law and the common
law systems. Disagreement over evidentiary and procedural rules impli-
cates efficiency concerns associated with the merging of judicial systems;
however, such disagreement does not usually implicate fundamental issues
of fairness, unlike much of the elements debate. Third, the proponents of
the ICC are not attempting to further the interests of justice at the expense
of procedural fairness. All of the negotiating delegations recognized (at
least in theory) the importance of procedural due process protections, and
there have been no efforts either to undermine the fundamental rights of
the accused or to expand those rights so as to stymie the Court."
In contrast, the Articles dealing with Elements of Crimes are unclear
and strongly contested. The problem with the Statute's treatment of
offenses (the "elements problem") is that the crimes listed in Articles 6, 7
and 8 are defined with insufficient precision and specificity 12 and thus
conflict with the principle of nullum crimen sine lege articulated in Article
22.13 In some cases, the offenses are defined ambiguously using verbiage
derived from law of war treaty antecedents; 14 in others, the substantive
offenses are duplicative.' 5 The lack of well-defined elements also makes
distinguishing specific intent crimes from general intent crimes or crimes
with some other heightened scienter requirement nearly impossible. For
example, Article 30 imposes criminal liability only when the "material ele-
ments are committed with intent and knowledge," and provides that
11. For example, while certain important initiatives (particularly in the area of vic-
tim's rights) are being furthered as these rules are drafted, no one is demanding eviscer-
ation of the right to remain silent or the right to cross examine witnesses.
12. For example, Article 8 includes "wilful killing" among its list of war crimes, but
provides no definition of this offense. See ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)(i). In
comparison, U.S. criminal statutes are normally drafted such that the elements are self-
evident to any criminal lawyer.
13. See supra note 6.
14. Much of the language in Article 8 derives from the Hague and Geneva Conven-
tions and uses esoteric terms that were neither widely understood nor consistently
defined among the law of war experts negotiating in Rome (based on informal author
poll). See e.g., "treacherously" (art. 8.2 (b)(xi)), "pillaging" (art. 8.2(b)(xvi)), "quarter"
(art. 8.2(b)(xii)). More significantly, many of these same terms were originally negoti-
ated with known or intended ambiguities. The meaning of "imperatively demanded by
the necessities of war" (art. 8.2(b)(xiii)) has evaded agreement for years. Similarly,
"buildings which are undefended" (art. 8.2(b)(v)) has been subject to several national
definitions. The difference between "poison" (art. 8.2(b)(xvii)) and "poisonous or other
gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices" (art. 8.2(b)(xviii)), or between
"biological experiments" (art. 8.2(a)(ii)) and "medical or scientific experiments" (art
8.2(b)(x)) is not widely recognized. These are but a few of the imprecise terms used in
one portion of the war crimes list; see also infra notes 27, 30-33 and accompanying text.
The crimes against humanity listed in Article 7 are somewhat better defined than the
Article 8 war crimes, but still suffer from similar ambiguities.
15. Duplication can be found throughout the war crimes in Article 8. See, e.g.,
crimes defined in Articles 8.2(a)(iv), 8.2(b)(xiii), 8.2(b)(xvi), 8.2(c)(v), and 8.2(e)(xii)
(describing destruction or appropriation of property); and Articles 8.2(b)(vi), 8.2(b)(xi),
and 8.2(e)(ix) (describing treacherous killing or wounding).
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"'knowledge' means awareness that a circumstance exists." 16 A strict read-
ing of this provision with respect to grave breaches might require, inter alia,
proof that an accused knew their victim was a protected person under the
Geneva Conventions, which make the victim's status as a protected person
a material element.' 7 On its face, Article 30 could conceivably be read to
exonerate perpetrators unfamiliar with that term of art. Such a reading
would clearly defeat the intent of Article 30, and also would violate the
principle that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" expressed in Article 32.
The PrepCom has since formulated the knowledge element of grave breach
offenses to avoid such an absurd result,' but the example nevertheless
highlights the need for detailed elements.
Unfortunately, not everyone in Rome agreed that the Statute's offenses
were insufficiently defined, and the United States expended a significant
amount of negotiating capital in securing the references to Elements of
Crimes now found in Articles 9 and 21 of the ICC Statute. 19 Many delega-
tions argued that any problems arising from the ambiguity of the elements
should be addressed by the judges. This is the method used in the Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 20
However, the ICTY differs substantially from the ICC; for example, the
ICTY's jurisdiction is both temporally and geographically limited, and it is
subject to the oversight of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover,
the ICTY is a special remedial tribunal established in response to a discrete
16. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 30, paras. 1 and 3.
17. The Geneva Conventions define grave breaches to include "wilful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of prop-
erty, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly," where
those acts were "committed against persons or property protected by the Convention."
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick].
18. The PrepCom definition of the knowledge element for grave breaches requires
that "such [victim or victims] were protected under one or more of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 and the accused was aware of the factual circumstances that established
this status." See Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator on Article 8: War
Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.2 (1999).
19. A variety of political and practical constraints prevented the drafters from defin-
ing the crimes falling within the Court's jurisdiction with sufficient precision for crimi-
nal law purposes. Therefore, the U.S. delegation proposed that Elements of Crimes be
negotiated during the PrepCom meetings; elements were to be negotiated by states prior
to anyone standing trial before the Court.
20. See Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993),
reprinted in 32 ILM 1159, 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The Statute was
adopted by the Security Council on May 25, 1993. See SC Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
827 (1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1203 (1993). See also Sean D. Murphy, Progress and
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J.
IIr'L L. 57, 87 (1999) (claiming that the ICTY and relevant treaties on international
humanitarian law do not describe "various elements that should be found in order to
determine whether the crime was committed").
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body of easily identified, egregious war crimes that (for the most part) had
already been completed.
In contrast, the ICC is a permanent Court that exercises worldwide
jurisdiction and will adjudicate an amorphous body of future crimes.
There are over ninety substantive offenses listed in the ICC Statute,21 not
including various formulations involving vicarious liability. The task of
negotiating multiple elements for each of these crimes is certainly daunt-
ing, and for many of the delegates, the Niirnberg,22 Yugoslov, and
Rwandan 23 Tribunals provided ample precedent for simply ignoring the
task.24
In addition, many delegations sought open-ended elements in order to
expand the discretion of the Court. These states envisioned a Court that
would not only adjudicate criminal cases, but also could define the law
and thus foster its evolution. However, judicial activism of this nature con-
flicts with the most fundamental principles of criminal law, and it is argua-
bly inconsistent with the Burkean conservative character of most English-
speaking judges. While the Court should ensure greater accountability for
perpetrators of the most serious violations of international law, it should
not accomplish this goal by leaving the elements problem to judicial discre-
tion; several hundred years of experience recommend against imbuing
judges with legislative power.
All of the crimes falling under the ICC's jurisdiction are based on cus-
tomary international law offenses. 25 In drafting elements for these
offenses, however, the PrepCom cannot merely restate customary norms
with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; these
customary norms are too imprecise for the Court to function effectively.
The general customary norms articulated in the Hague and Geneva Con-
21. The exact number is subject to debate depending how various Articles are
parsed by practitioners. For example, at the July 26-August 13 PrepCom meeting, Arti-
cle 8.2(a)(ii) ("[t]orture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments") was
divided into three distinct crimes for purposes of developing criminal elements.
22. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of the Major War
Criminals, appended to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, as
amended, Protocol to Agreement and Charter, Oct. 6, 1945 thereinafter Nurnberg
Charter].
23. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 ILM 1598, 1602 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
24. Like the ICTY Statute, the Nrnberg Charter and ICTR Statute do not clarify
Elements of Crimes. When assessing the relevance of this fact, however, one should
consider that these tribunals were established ex post facto and their subject matter juris-
diction presumed crimes so firmly established that detailing elements was not
necessary.
25. See, e.g., 1 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/51/22
(1996) (referencing the customary international law status of the definitions of crimes
in the Statute and noting that several delegations argued that the Statute should codify
customary international law but not create new substantive law). To speed the drafting
process, the negotiators decided that only those crimes having a foundation in custom-
ary international law would be listed in the Statute. Otherwise, achieving agreement on
the list of offenses would have substantially delayed negotiations.
1999 Structural Pillars for the ICC
ventions and other relevant treaties were intended to be implemented and
enforced by states through domestic legislation. But in the case of the ICC,
the international community must create that implementing legislation
and recast the broad norms of customary international law into specific
provisions relevant to criminal lawyers and judges. In particular, interna-
tional norms must be translated into criminal provisions; general proscrip-
tions must be reduced to specific elements of proof; and law directed at
states must be converted into prerequisites for individual criminal culpabil-
ity. These are the most important tasks directly associated with taking
international criminal law from theory to practice. By enhancing certainty
and predictability, it should also make the law more relevant for govern-
ment officials and military personnel.
Developing elements that are consistent with prevailing U.S. standards
will require a tedious review of potential factual scenarios to ensure that
guilt attaches only when the accused is genuinely culpable. When going
through that process, one cannot help but recognize the delicate nature of
the balancing act. Developing elements that close loopholes while preclud-
ing prosecution for justified acts of violence will be no easy task, especially
in warfare scefiarios where violence and aggression necessarily lie at the
root of state action.
Some examples are instructive in this regard. One of the first war
crimes listed in Article 8 is that of "[w]ilfully causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or health."26 While the Geneva Conventions27 and
Pictet's Commentary28 provide some interpretive guidance, the substance
of this and other offenses is much in question. Few criminal offenses are
defined simply by result. Moreover, "great suffering," even among persons
"protected" under the Geneva Conventions, is a common result of warfare.
During recent PrepCom negotiations in New York, even those negotiators
who initially claimed that law of war principles could provide a wealth of
interpretive guidelines could not easily identify the nature of this offense.
Other examples of ambiguously or poorly defined offenses include
"wounding treacherously," 2 9 "attacking . ..buildings which are unde-
fended,"30 and "persecution," defined as "intentional and severe depriva-
tion of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the
identity of the group or collectivity."31 There is a manifest need to clarify
26. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8, para. 2(a)(iii).
27. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick, supra note 17, arts. 49-51; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 50-52, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 102, 105-08, 129-131,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 146-48, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
28. 1 COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CON-
VENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED
FoRcEs IN THE FIELD (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952).
29. ICC Statute, supra note 1, art. 8, para. 2(b)(xi).
30. Id. art. 8, para. 2(b)(v).
31. Id. art. 7, para. 1(h) and 2(g).
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the elements of these harms. 32
Many of the ICC negotiators argued that the elements problem could
be resolved by merely applying the customary interpretive techniques
found in Articles 31 and 32 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
33
Unfortunately, these techniques (i.e., plain meaning analysis, recourse to
negotiating history) will yield little dispositive guidance appropriate for a
criminal courtroom. The terms of international treaties, especially those
involving the laws of war, are negotiated so as to achieve consensus rather
than dear, precise terminology. The ambiguity in treaty provisions is often
deliberate rather than the result of poor drafting; for example, ambiguious
terms may reflect a lack of agreed intent. Given these caveats, a close tex-
tual analysis of the Statute would be an ill-conceived effort.
The elements problem not only encourages disrespect for the Court
and the rule of law generally, but also invites politically motivated abuse.
Much of the United States' concern regarding the ICC's jurisdictional
mechanism arises from the risk that the Court will be used as a tool to
influence U.S. foreign policy, i.e., by exposing those who make and imple-
ment that policy to potential liability. When the jus ad bellum basis for a
particular military action is questioned, we might find that judges will be
less hesitant to question the jus in bello implementation issues raised by
the actions of commanders and armed forces personnel. 34
Although the development of elements is unpopular among those
most optimistic about the ICC's deterrent effect, elements of proof provide
a practical restraint on ignoble prosecutorial and judicial overreaching
designed to achieve political ends. Ironically, the fear that elements may
excessively circumscribe judicial authority is probably inverted. Interna-
tional judges frequently bind themselves by conservative rules to ensure
they are not viewed as stepping outside the bounds of "customary" law.
Unnecessary judicial restraint could result in a failure to convict when war-
ranted. The articulation of specific elements may obviate the problem of
inappropriate judicial hesitancy.
32. See also supra notes 12 and 14 for additional examples of imprecision in Article
8.
33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 ILM 679. Article 31(1) provides that "[a] treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." Article 32
further provides that "[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in
order to confirm [its] meaning."
34. Since the delivery of these remarks, events in Kosovo have provided a quintessen-
tial example of this dynamic. There is increasing political pressure for ICTY prosecutor
Louise Arbour to investigate "war crimes" committed by NATO forces that are subject to
ICTYjurisdiction. See, e.g.,Jonathan M. Miller, International Law May Halt the Bombing,
L.A. TIMEs, May 11, 1999, at A-13 (arguing that bombing as a form of pressure is illegal,
and that NATO officials and military personnel possibly could be indicted for the war
crime of "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity").
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II. Initial Problems in Elements Negotiations
Negotiation of detailed specific elements that define criminal culpability is
somewhat uncommon in the international context. The delegations oppos-
ing the development of specific elements rarely argued that it was bad idea;
rather, they argued that it was either too hard or was unnecessary. Indeed,
accomplishing the task before June 200035 will involve overcoming a
number of hurdles. Listed below in no particular order are some of the
PrepCom's most noteworthy challenges.
First, the concept of elements of proof has proved to be culturally and
legally unintelligible for many delegations.3 6 An exposition on compara-
tive law is beyond the scope of this Article, but suffice it to say that civil law
notions, like the French concept of "intimate conviction,"3 7 do'not con-
form well to our criminal law concept of elements of proof. In an effort to
avoid judicial limitation, some states have recommended elements that are
merely illustrative examples. Moreover, many states wanted to provide a
list of factors the judges could require the prosecutor to prove in lieu of
specific elements. Such concepts are completely inconsistent with the
common understanding of elements within those states (such as the
United States) that apply them.
The second problem area is closely related to the first. The ICC Stat-
ute provides for inchoate offenses, 38 including several forms of vicarious
liability (e.g., command responsibility, solicitation, and incitement of geno-
cide) as well as standard attempt, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting the-
ories. Drafting elements that contemplate inchoate offenses yet remain
internally coherent is only possible when elements are crafted to specifi-
cally cover the theories of liability found in Articles 25 and 28 of the stat-
utes. The inchoate offenses section of the U.S. proposal simplifies the task
of applying the Elements of Crimes when culpability is based on theories
described in Articles 25 and 28 of the Statute. Thus, a rote application of
the elements as written would appear nonsensical. In some instances, the
Statute provides for liability regardless of the actual perpetrator of the act,
35. See supra note 4.
36. An example of the difficulties caused by this unfamiliarity is found in the term
chosen for the ICC Statute, "Elements of Crimes." The ICC Statute uses only the latter
term to accommodate those who were concerned that the term "proof' implied more
constraint on judges. However, the majority view now seems to be moving toward the
American concept of the role of elements in defining criminal culpability.
37. French law does not use a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for criminal
convictions but rather require that the trier of fact have an inner certainty (intimate
conviction) of the defendant's guilt. Moreover, intimate conviction is based on the total-
ity of the evidence presented; the trier of fact may give greater weight to some elements
and find a defendant guilty even if the evidence supporting a particular element is weak,
provided the evidence as a whole establishes the requisite inner certainty of guilt. In
contrast, U.S. criminal law requires every element of a crime to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to support a conviction.
38. Inchoate offenses are defined as "incipient crime[s] which generally lead to
another crime." BLAcK's LAv DIcIoNARY 761 (6th ed. 1990). As used in the U.S. propo-
sal, the section refers to all instances involving criminal culpability when the accused
themselves do not complete the actus reus of the offense in question.
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or whether the act is completed. However, in such cases, the general prin-
ciples of Articles 25 and 28 would require additional elements not neces-
sary for direct culpability under the Article 6, 7, or 8 offenses. The
inchoate offenses section of the U.S. proposal does not in any way change
or affect the general principles of criminal law found in the Statute. It
simply explains the application of additional elements when the theory of
criminality does not flow directly from an actus reus perpetuated by the
accused. But unfortunately, Article 9 only refers to the articulation of ele-
ments for crimes found in Articles 6, 7, and 8. Since other theories of
criminal liability are found in Articles 25 and 28, many view the develop-
ment of elements for these theories as ultra vires for the PrepCom.
A third problem is that many delegations adopted positions on what
form the elements should take based on specific events; recent examples of
humanitarian tragedy understandably animated much of the debate in
Rome. However, elements drafted based on the facts of a particular event
may not adequately encompass future scenarios. A single-minded ex post
facto focus is clearly inappropriate for the ICC. Instead, the PrepCom mis-
sion should "imagine the past and remember the future."39
The fourth and fifth problems are closely related. One difficulty is
that the U.S. proposals are viewed with extreme skepticism because the
United States has clearly stated that it is unwilling to sign or support the
current ICC Statute. Since the United States has yet to specify the mini-
mum changes necessary to garner U.S. support for the Statute, many
assume these changes are being introduced sub rosa through the Elements
of Crimes proposals. The related problem is the assumption that the
United State sought detailed elements in order to protect U.S. troops from
prosecution. For example, many delegates viewed the U.S.-proposed ele-
ments for the crime of genocide40 as an effort to raise the bar for prosecu-
tors, since an element not readily apparent in the Statute itself was being
added. The U.S. proposal in fact aimed to preclude prosecution of isolated
hate-crimes under the genocide provisions.41 These misperceptions, cou-
39. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 13, citing
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. The 1949 Genocide Convention does not clearly identify the constituents that
justify individual criminal liability for the crime of genocide. The Convention broadly
defines genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, such as: a) Killing members of the
group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c)
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
41. After heated negotiations, the informal working group handling the genocide
elements ultimately agreed on a text that included an appropriate contextual element.
The current working document for Article 6 now specifies the following elements: that
"[t]he accused knew or should have known that the conduct would destroy, in whole or
in part, such group or that the conduct was part of a pattern of similar conduct directed
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pled with a general lack of understanding of the nature of criminal ele-
ments, have led to such comments as "if there is any doubt as to the need
for an element, we should leave it out to avoid risk that we might prevent a
prosecution."42 This may be a logical policy for states that do not use ele-
ments, but it is an inconceivable approach for those states which rely on
precisely articulated elements.
A sixth problem arising during PrepCom negotiations has already
been mentioned: namely, the preference for ambiguity in international
negotiations. Inducing 120 or more countries to reach agreement is under-
standably an extremely difficult task. Negotiating parties rarely will see
eye-to-eye on all controversial issues. Therefore, diplomats have become
adept at the use of ambiguous, nuanced terms to bridge the gaps between
substantively different positions. This system works well when states inter-
pret agreements for themselves and there is no ultimate authority to tell
them when they are wrong. However, ambiguity and nuance do not work
well in the criminal context. Criminal law employs extreme enforcement
mechanisms and therefore requires precision and specificity. Equally sig-
nificant, states (or state-approved arbitral panels) will not have the freedom
to interpret ambiguous statutory provisions, as they can with other negoti-
ated agreements. Finally, judges (not states) will be making life-changing
decisions on the interpretation of the ICC Statute. This difficult conflict
between the normal pattern for achieving international agreement and the
need for statutory precision constitutes a major challenge for the PrepCom.
Finally, a seventh problem concerns the paradigm on which many ICC
proponents base their opinions, i.e., the overly simplistic perspective that
international humanitarian law progresses in a linear fashion, with pro-
gress equaling more law. Mr. Philippe Kirsch, chair of the Rome Diplo-
matic Conference's Committee of the Whole43 and of the PrepCom, has
described the ICC's vision as moving the international community from a
culture of "impunity" to one of "accountability." 44 Unfortunately, this
shift is sometimes crassly viewed as a simple movement to more prosecu-
tions for more offenses. Anything that threatens to inhibit prosecutions or
the expansion of the corpus of offenses is wrongly seen by some states as
antithetical to progress. Criminal elements, to the extent they are viewed as
a constraint on potential prosecutions and judicial discretion, are thus
often perceived as handicapping the pursuit of justice.
against that group." See Discussion Paper Proposed by the Coordinator on Article 6: The
Crime of Genocide, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/RT.1 (1999).
42. By way of anecdote, one proposal during an informal session of the PrepCom
was to delete certain questionable elements that might constrain the Court. Had these
elements in fact been deleted, criminal culpability for "inhuman treatment" under Arti-
cle 8(2)(a)(ii) could be established if only two elements were met: 1) that the accused's
act occurred in the context of an armed conflict, and 2) that the act was directed against
a "protected person." No limitation regarding the nature of the act was deemed
necessary.
43. The Committee of the Whole was that body at the Rome diplomatic conference
responsible for negotiating the ICC Statute.
44. Kirsch, supra note 5, at 437.
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Conclusion
The ICC represents an attempt to fill an enforcement void in international
humanitarian law. Unfortunately, the belief that movement in a given
direction can adequately define progress yields a mistaken paradigm. The
better metaphor would be the commonly seen symbol of justice - scales
achieving a careful balance. The rights of the accused and the sovereign
rights of states in our international community must be carefully balanced
against the interests of justice. Elements of proof provide one of the checks
that can assist in providing this balance. Many ICC proponents have fre-
quently recited the mantra that "there is no peace without justice" (they are
sometimes countered with the retort that "there is no justice without
peace"). Ultimately, however, appropriate checks and balances (such as
carefully drafted criminal elements and properly crafted rules of procedure
and rules of evidence) are not oriented toward justice in any specific case
or peace in any given conflict, but are rather directed toward establishing
and preserving the rule of law. There can be neither peace nor justice
except under a firmly established rule of law.
